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Abstract 
 
Cross-Drive Analysis (CDA) is a technique designed to allow an investigator to 
“simultaneously consider information from across a corpus of many data sources” 
[1]. Existing approaches include multi-drive correlation using text searching, e.g. 
email addresses, message IDs, credit card numbers or social security numbers. 
Such techniques have the potential to identify drives of interest from a large set, 
provide additional information about events that occurred on a single disk, and 
potentially determine social network membership. 
Another analysis technique that has significantly advanced in recent years 
is the use of timelines. Tools currently exist that can extract dates and times from 
the file system metadata (i.e. MACE times) and also examine the content of certain 
file types and extract metadata from within. This approach provides a great deal of 
data that can assist with an investigation, but also compounds the problem of 
having too much data to examine. 
A recent paper adds an additional timeline analysis capability, by 
automatically producing a high-level summary of the activity on a computer 
system, by combining sets of low-level events into high-level events, for example 
reducing a setupapi event and several events from the Windows Registry to a 
single event of ‘a USB stick was connected’. 
This paper provides an investigation into the extent to which events in 
such a high-level timeline have the properties suitable to assist with Cross-Drive 
Analysis. The paper provides several examples that use timelines generated from 
multiple disk images, including USB stick connections, Skype calls, and access to 
files on a memory card. 
1.0  Introduction 
Cross-Drive Analysis (CDA) is a technique designed to allow an investigator to 
“simultaneously consider information from across a corpus of many data 
sources”[1]. This paper reports on an initial investigation into how automatically 
generated high-level timelines such at those produced in [2] could be used for 
Cross-Drive Analysis.  
 The paper makes the following contributions: it demonstrates that Cross-
Drive analysis can be performed on automatically generated high-level timelines; it 
shows how visualisations, filtering and grouping of such timelines can be used as 
part of investigations; it also demonstrates that when low-level timelines are being 
produced it is extremely useful to preserve information such as evidence source.  
 The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides background to the 
research and also discusses related work. Section 3 provides the methodology for 
the research and justifies the synthesised scenario based approach used. Section 4 
provides the results of three case studies: USB connections, Skype use, and access 
to files on a memory card. Section 5 evaluates the research and discusses 
limitations of the research in its current form, and Section 6 provides the 
conclusions and discusses future work. 
2.0  Background 
This section provides a background discussion of Cross-Drive analysis and 
timeline analysis techniques.  
2.1  Background 
Complex digital forensic investigations can involve multiple computer systems, 
potentially from multiple users located in multiple locations. This introduces 
challenges such as the volume of data, and the number and variety of devices to be 
examined. There are multiple approaches to addressing these challenges, including 
technological e.g. parallel processing [3], and procedural e.g. ‘Triage’[4].  
 A specific technique that not only attempts to address the problem of 
multiple drives, but also exploits this property to recover more relevant evidence is 
Cross-Drive Analysis.  
 
2.2  Related Work: Cross-Drive Analysis 
Cross-Drive Analysis is a technique designed to “allow an investigator to 
simultaneously consider information from across a corpus of many data sources” 
[1]. The technique is presented as offering several benefits: automatic 
identification of ‘hot drives’; improving the analysis of single drives; identification 
of social network membership; and unsupervised social network discovery. These 
are discussed below.   
 
Automatic identification of ‘hot drives’ 
This involves processing multiple drives in order to identify those from a large 
collection that are of particular interest, and therefore which should be given the 
highest priority for examination. The example provided in [1] relates to the US 
legislation FACT-ACT: which details the requirement to remove consumer 
information from IT equipment prior to its disposal. The example goes on to use 
Cross-Drive Analysis in conjunction with Forensic Feature Extraction (FFE) on a 
set of disks to recover particular forms of consumer information (e.g. social 
security numbers) and to identify those drives that have the most features of this 
type.  
 
Improving the analysis of single drives 
In addition to identifying a subset of drives of interest, through the analysis of 
multiple drives it is possible that the analysis of a single drive can be improved. 
The example provided in [1] is to determine information that can be safely ignored 
on drives examined in future, e.g. a ‘stop list’. While not explicitly discussed in 
[1], it is also possible to use data obtained on a drive or set of drives to establish 
information about another device, for example, to use an iPhone backup located on 
a seized drive to recover data that was stored on an iPhone that may not be in the 
possession of the investigator [5].  
 
Identification of social network membership and unsupervised social network 
discovery 
Cross-Drive Analysis can also be used to determine the nature of social networks 
e.g. determining if is a drive connected in some manner to another set of drives. 
  
 
The artefacts that are correlated across drives in [1] are termed ‘Features’ 
and are pseudo-unique identifiers which have “sufficient entropy such that within a 
given corpus it is highly unlikely that the identifier will be repeated by chance”. 
Example features include email address, message ID and subject, date and time 
stamps, cookies, US social security numbers and credit card numbers.  
 The feature extraction approach in [1] attempts to address the problem of 
“improper emphasis on document recovery” i.e. that relevant data on a disk may 
not necessarily be a file, but may still be useful. However, while feature extraction 
does not focus on documents, it does still to a certain extent focus on content e.g. 
credit card numbers or email addresses. Another approach may be instead to focus 
on event reconstruction. 
 
2.3  Related Work: Timeline Analysis 
It is difficult to discuss event reconstruction without discussing timelines. Early 
timeline analysis involved the recovery of file system dates and times (typically 
Modified, Accessed, Created, and Entry Modified (MACE) times) in order to 
determine user activity [6], [7]. More advanced techniques now supplement these 
basic file times with dates and times contained within files, for example, file times 
extracted from Link Files, last updated times for Windows Registry keys, URL 
access times from index.dat, or log entries from setupapi files [8-10]. Use of this 
technique recovers a vast number of events from computer systems. For example a 
system that has been in in use for just a few months can produce millions of these 
‘system’ or ‘low-level’ events.  
 Reference [2] builds on top of this low-level event extraction and 
describes the development of a Python based prototype that can automatically 
reconstruct higher-level, more human understandable events. For example, a low-
level event for a specific entry in the SAM registry hive, the creation of a specific 
user folder in /Users and the creation of a NTUSER.DAT in that folder can be used 
to infer the creation of a user account on Windows 7. This automated high-level 
event reconstruction is achieved through a plug-in based system of ‘analysers’ that 
scan the low-level timeline looking for patterns of one or more low-level events 
that are used to infer the high-level event. In the developed system provenance of 
the inferred high-level event is preserved in the exported XML timeline which 
maintains references to the low-level events that were used to identify the high-
level event. This includes preserving the low-level events that were searched for 
and found (supporting artefacts) and also any low-level that were searched for but 
were not found (contradictory artefacts). Furthermore, all the low-level events are 
preserved in a SQLite database and each low-level event contains provenance 
values that describe how this event was extracted e.g. an entry in a log file, an 
offset in a binary file or a SQL query and row number. This approach provides full 
traceability from a high-level, human understandable event back down the raw data 
that caused the event’s supporting artefacts to be originally extracted. 
This automated analysis approach produces a much smaller set of events 
that is determined by the number of ‘analysers’ that are run. Reference [2] 
highlights that this move from “hundreds of thousands of low-level events to a few 
hundred, human understandable events may open up new possibilities for 
visualisation of data from digital forensic investigations and enable the 
development of tools with much greater analysis capabilities”. The example 
provided is the exporting of the timeline into Timeflow format, which is a timeline 
visualisation software from Flowing Media [11]. 
The need to move beyond forensic tools that focus on finding files as 
pieces of evidence is highlighted in [12], which states that today’s tools are 
difficult to use to “reconstruct a unified timeline of past events or the actions of a 
perpetrator”. The automated approach to high-level timeline reconstruction in [2] is 
designed to achieve exactly that and could allow more advanced analysis and 
visualisation techniques to be used. 
While Cross-Drive Analysis in [1] focused on correlating content across 
multiple drives it is possible that the same could be done with the high-level events 
generated in [2]. This is the focus of the research reported in this paper. 
 
3.0 Methodology 
3.1 Aim 
The aim of this research is to investigate how the automatically generated high-
level timelines produced in [2] could be used for Cross-Drive Analysis.  
3.2 Research Method Overview 
The research method used in this paper is to use a series of examples to 
demonstrate how automatically generated high-level timelines could be used for 
Cross-Drive Analysis. The three examples used demonstrate the three potential 
benefits to digital investigations described in Section 2.2 (identifying drives of 
interest, improving analysis of a single device, and determining social network 
membership).  
 Each example involves a description of a fictitious scenario, the synthesis 
of a small dataset that contains artefacts related to the scenarios, automated 
generation of timelines for the resulting disk images, and the subsequent analysis 
using a visualisation tool. Each of these stages are discussed in more detail in the 
following sub-sections.  
 
3.3 Scenarios 
As discussed earlier three examples are used to demonstrate the use of high-level 
timelines for Cross-Drive Analysis.  
 
Scenario 1: Identification of ‘hot drives’ 
In this scenario a personal USB drive has been found on the floor of an office 
containing four computers.  The site is a secure facility and staff within the office 
are permitted to use only regulation USB sticks to transfer data. The non-approved 
USB drive that was found contained restricted documents and therefore the person 
responsible for the USB stick is in violation of a number of regulations.  
 
Scenario 2: Enhancing the analysis of a single disk/device 
In this second scenario a computer and camera phone have been seized from a 
suspect who has allegedly been making indecent images with their the phone and 
storing them on their computer. Examination of the mobile phone memory card has 
not revealed any relevant images. The phone cannot be examined as it has been 
irreparably damaged. 
 
Scenario 3: Determining social network membership 
The third scenario involves an investigation into the cause of a recent shopping 
centre riot. Four suspects have been identified that may have been communicating 
with each other via Skype. Each of the suspect’s computers are to be examined to 
determine who was involved with the organisation of the riot. 
 
3.4 Data Generation 
For each of the scenarios Virtual Machines (VM) were created using VMware 
Workstation. Each VM had a small 20Gb virtual hard disk created and Windows 7 
Enterprise Edition was installed. Actions consistent with the scenarios were carried 
out on the VMs and documented. Finally the virtual hard disks were preserved as 
flat dd style images for later analysis.  
 
3.5 Timeline Generation 
The disk images from each of the scenarios were analysed using the timeline tool 
described in Section 2.3. The low and high-level timelines were preserved 
including the XML timeline and the Timeflow representation.  
 
3.6 Analysis and Visualisation 
In each case the ‘analysis’ was actually performed using Timeflow [11]. This tool 
from Flowing Media provides grouping and filtering capabilities. ‘Grouping’ 
determines how events are split into horizontal groups in the timeline or how 
events are colour coordinated. ‘Filtering’ allows keywords or event types to be 
hidden or shown in the timeline.  
4.0 Results 
This section details the results of the analysis of the three scenarios described in the 
previous section.  
 
4.1 Scenario 1: Identifying Drives of Interest 
Manual Analysis 
In this scenario since a prohibited USB stick was found in an office containing four 
computers, each of the systems need to be analysed to identify if the USB stick was 
connected. Forensically sound examination of these systems should involve 
imaging and an analysis of the disk image. To identify if the specific USB stick 
was connected, the setupapi.app.log should be examined in conjunction with the 
Windows Registry.  
 
Automated Timeline Generation 
A case file was created for this scenario including the four disk images from the 
four computers. After the low-level timeline generation, just over 2.6 million 
events were produced. Such data can be searched using tools such as Grep for 
keywords, but even this relatively small number of events is difficult to visualise in 
a useful way. The high-level event analysis process was run using 32 analysers, 
which produced a high-level timeline consisting of 298 high-level events. The 
Timeflow version of this high-level timeline was loaded and grouped by ‘Evidence 
Source’ as shown in Figure 1. The timeline was then analysed simply by filtering 
by the term ‘USB’ as shown in Figure 2. This filtered the results so that 5 events 
remained, 4 of which are artefacts from the construction of the VM. However, the 
remaining event clearly shows the connection of a Freecom Databar USB device 
connected to Computer 2 (Figure 3). While it cannot be shown in the Timeflow 
visualisation, the provenance of this high-level event is also preserved, including 
the low-level events that were used to infer this high-level event (shown in Figure 
4) and the location of the original data that was used to generate the low-level 
events, in this case the line number of the setupapi.app.log and the offset in the 
Registry hive of the raw data used to extract the Registry keys.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Timeline showing high-level events relating to each computer system that is 
suspected of connecting a prohibited USB device. The events are grouped by evidence 
source showing the events that occurred on each computer. 
 
 
Figure 2: A simple filter applied to the timelines for ‘usb’ 
 
Figure 3: The timeline that results from the ‘usb’ filter. This demonstrates that a Freecom 
Databar was connected to Computer 2. 
 
Figure 4: Details for the identified high-level event, including the low-level events that were 
used to infer it. This can also be used to inspect the SQLite database to view the low-level 
events and the raw data that caused the low-level event to be created. 
 
4.2 Scenario 2: Enhancing the analysis of a single disk/device 
Manual Analysis 
In this scenario since a computer and a memory card have been seized for 
examination, both require analysis. No files of interest have been found on the 
memory card, but it is still necessary to determine if the images were stored on the 
memory card, as it is this card that was found in the camera phone that is believed 
to have produced the images. Manual analysis in this case involves determining the 
connection of the memory card to the computer and establishing the drive letter 
that was used at the time. Following on from this it may be possible to use artefacts 
such as Link Files or the Windows Search database to determine information about 
files that previously existed on the memory card.  
 
Automated Timeline Generation 
Use of the timeline generation tool produced just over half a million low-level 
events and after running the high-level timeline analysis, 112 high-level events 
were produced.  The high-level events were loaded into Timeflow (Figure 5) and 
subsequently sorted by device (Figure 6), showing events on Computer 1, and two 
drives with their volume serial numbers displayed.  (C:\ (18e5-a8ac), E:\ (c595-
ce08)).  
 By further filtering the results (shown in Figure 7), it can be seen that there 
was an image created on the memory card in 2010 by the name of 
‘03042010003.jpg’. The timeline shows a connection of a Nokia S60 device 
followed by an access of a file of the same name and path as that on the memory 
card.  
 The process of mapping the Nokia USB device to drive E:\ has not yet been 
fully automated and still requires a number of manual steps involving the 
setupapi.app.log and the computer’s system Registry.   
 In any case, this example demonstrates that additional information about a 
device  (in this case the dates of files created on a memory card) can be obtained 
by examining a different device (a PC) that the memory card has interacted with.  
 
 
Figure 5: Timeline of high-level events from the memory card example 
  
Figure 6: Timeline of high-level events from the memory card example 
  
Figure 7: Filtered results showing connection of Nokia USB device and details relating to 
03042010004.jpg. The creation date and time of the image on the E:\ drive have been 
extrapolated from the link file created when the file was accessed on the computer. 
 
4.3 Scenario 3:  - Determining Social Network Membership – Skype Example 
Manual Analysis 
In this example of an investigation into a shopping centre riot, the computers of 
four suspects are being examined. Manual analysis in this case would involve an 
examination of Skype databases and manual correlation to establish connections 
and potentially the construction of a social network diagram.  
 
Automated Timeline Generation 
After the examination of all four disks, just over 2.9 million low-level events were 
generated and 672 high-level events.  The high-level events were then loaded into 
Timeflow and sorted by ‘Evidence Source’ (Figure 8).  The events were then 
filtered using the term ‘skype contact request’ (shown in Figure 9), reducing the 
number of events to 8. From these results it can be seen in Figure 10 that users 
McDee, Ferris and Dylan were communicating with each other prior to the date of 
the riot (5th July), with user Smith only joining the Skype social network after the 
event.   
 
 
Figure 8: Timeline of high-level events sorted by ‘evidence source’ 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Filter for ‘skype contact request’
 
Figure 10: Timeline of Skype contact requests before and after the riot. The vertical line has 
been added to the diagram to highlight the date of the riot. 
 
 
The advantage of using a timeline visualisation tool to display a social network is 
that the evolution of the network can be more easily followed.  With traditional 
social network diagrams such as that shown in Figure 11, the social network is 
viewed as a static entity and therefore does not communicate the order in which the 
network was created, or the structure of the network at any given time. This makes 
it difficult to answer specific questions such as those discussed in this scenario i.e. 
to understand which users were members of the network prior to an event taking 
place. 
 
 
Figure 11: An example static social network diagram of the people in the shopping centre 
riot scenario. It would be possible to depict the evolution of the social network using an 
animation, which cannot be shown here, or a sequence of images, which does not scale well 
for larger networks. 
 
5.0 Evaluation 
 
The results shown in the previous section clearly demonstrate the potential for 
high-level timelines being used for Cross-Drive Analysis. The first example shows 
that high-level timeline generation can make the analysis process extremely simple 
in terms of identifying drives of interest. The second example demonstrates that by 
examining multiple systems, it is possible to infer additional information about a 
system that may not have evidence of actions on it. This also applies to devices that 
may not even be in the possession of the investigator. The final example 
demonstrates the ability to determine social network membership and also 
introduces the time dimension so that the evolution of the social network over time 
can be seen.  
 However, there are limitations. The data sets are particularly simple in terms 
of the size of the disk and the complexity of the disk images (the low number of 
high-level events recovered and the amount of ‘background noise’). This is 
particularly apparent with the first example where a very simple example has been 
chosen. It is necessary to develop a much more detailed scenario with a complex 
criteria for drives of interest to provide a through test of the benefits of this 
approach.  
 The second example shows that examination of multiple devices can be 
used to improve the analysis of a single device; in the example provided this was to 
identify information that could not be recovered from a specific device. However, 
the application in [1] was not demonstrated i.e. the use of multiple drive analysis to 
exclude data from future analyses. In the case of high-level timelines, this would 
involve the creation of a new ‘whitelist of events’. These events would be those 
that are as a result of a Windows installation, for example the creation of the 
pictures in the ‘Sample Pictures’ folder, which may be of use as supporting 
artefacts for a ‘Windows Installation’ event, but as high-level events on their own 
are of limited interest. 
 While the third example does demonstrate social network membership it has 
not taken full advantage of the high-level abstraction offered by the automated 
timeline analysis. A more extensive scenario in this case would involve more 
participants that are communicating using a variety of technologies. It should still 
be possible to produce an analyser that identifies communication between 
participants using any of these communication methods and how communication 
patterns and methods change over time. This would exploit the benefits offered by 
the timeline analysis to a much greater extent.  
 Despite these the limitations the research has demonstrated use of high-level 
timelines for Cross-Drive Analysis and highlighted some interesting further work 
to be carried out to more extensively investigate their use. Furthermore the paper 
has clearly demonstrated an analysis tool that is not simply a view of files (in table, 
tree or gallery form) and presented data in a novel way that can assist in an 
investigation though providing an abstraction layer that would allow an 
investigator to focus on finding events of interest rather than the extraction of data 
and reconstruction of what the system has been used for. 
 While the tool used in this case to generate high-level timelines makes 
every effort to function in a forensic manner, particularly preserving the 
provenance of high-level events so they are traceable down to the raw data, it is 
important to highlight that it is not intended as a replacement for a full forensic 
analysis. The work in this paper is intended to be used to highlight drives of 
interest that may need to be prioritised over others or to infer links that may be 
missed when a manual process is required.  
 
6.0 Conclusions and Future Work 
 
The aim of this paper was to investigate the potential for high-level timelines for 
Cross-Drive Analysis and that has certainly been addressed, although there are 
many limitations to the research that will need to be addressed in a future paper, as 
discussed in the previous section.  
 In addition to the future work described in the previous section that 
enhanced the scenarios used to make them more suited to high-level timeline based 
Cross-Drive Analysis, there are also new scenarios that provide examples that are 
extremely difficult to determine from a manual analysis of multiple drives, for 
example, a trip being planned and booked by multiple suspects, on different forms 
of transport, using different computers and devices. Also multiple people or 
devices being used to purchase items that individually are not of interest, but may 
be in combination.  
Finally, as digital devices are used more extensively in everyday life the 
amount of evidence of peoples’ actions that these devices contain increases. In 
addition, the number of devices in use by individuals is also increasing. The need 
for techniques that are able to examine multiple devices and produce a coherent 
report of activity across them is likely to increase and therefore is an area that 
requires much future work. 
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